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This paper analyzes equilibrium in labor markets with costly search.
Even in steady state equilibrium, identical labormay receive different
wages; this may be the case even when the only source of imperfect
information is the inequality of wages which the market isperpetuating.
When there are information imperfections arising from (symmetric)
differences in non-pecuniary characteristics of jobs and preferences of
individuals, there will not in general exist a full employment, zero profit
single wage equilibrium.
There are, in general, a multiplicity of equilbria. Equilibriummay be
characterized by unemployment; in spite of the presence of an excess supply
of labor, no firm is willing to hire workers at a lowerwage. It knows that
if it does so, the quit rate will be higher, and hence turnover costs(training
costs) will be higher, so much so that profits will actually be lower. The
model thus provides a rationale for real wage rigidity. The model also
provides a theory of equilibrium frictional unemployment.
Though the constrained optimality (taking explicitly into account the
costs associated with obtaining information and search)may entail
unemployment and wage dispersion, the levels of unemployment and wage








The observation that different firms pay different prices for what
appears to be the same commodity or pay different wages for what appears to
be equivalent labor has long been explained in economics by areference to
"imperfectinformation." This paper is concerned with characterizing market
equilibrium with imperfect information. We do not present a general theory;
rather, we develop in some detail an example of importance in its ownright——
imperfectinformation in the labor market.Severalproperties of our example,
inparticular, the existence of equilibria with price (wage) dispersion, i.m—
employment (excess supply of labor), positive profits (excess demand for labor),
multiple equilibria and the non—optimality of some or all of the equilibria,
we believe are of more general validity; other results may not be.
This paper is concerned with two kinds of imperfect information:
(a) Individuals may not know the wage paid in any particular firm, or
whether there is a vacancy in any particular firm,untilthey applyfora job.1
*Fjnancjalsupport from the Ford, National Science, Rockefeller, andGuggen- heim Foundationsis gratefully acknowledged. I am indebted to S.Salop, J.Mirrlees, Barry Nalebüff, P. Diamond, and two anonymous referees for
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Wage Structure" (Institute for Development Studies, Nairobi, andCowles
Foundation, Yale, 1971), "Equilibrium Wage Distributions," Cowles Foundation
Discussion Paper No. 375 (1972), and IMSSS Technical Report 154, Stanford, (1974).
Since the original version of this paper was completed, a large literature
has developed on this topic. We do not provide here even a partial biblio-
graphy of this literature. The Cowles Foundation version contains a more
extended discussion of the two—sector model briefly discussed in Section 5.3
below.—,—
(b)There are a number of characteristics besides the wage rate asso-
ciated with any job which are important to the individual. Some, like the
normal length of a work week, become known when the individual applies for
the job; information about other characteristics (e.g., personalities of
colleagues) is acquired only gradually.
There is one important difference between the two kinds of imperfect
information: there is a return to natching individuals up with jobs that
suit them in any economic system. There will be imperfect information of
thissort so long as individuals and jobs differ. On the other hand, the
imperfect information resulting from wage dispersion is a kind of imperfect
informationgenerated by the market itself. Inparticular, a socialist
economycould, if it chose, simply pay a uniform wage for identical labor.
Weare used to thinkingof markets as serving a useful function in conveying
information, e.g., about demands andsupplies,Our analysis suggests that,
under certain conditions, the market may, in effect, unnecessarily "create"
imperfectionsof information which, not surprisingly, may turn out to be
quite costly.
There are two problems in constructing an equilibrium odel with imper-
fect information: first, how do we prevent the eventual accumulation of
information? If individuals were infinitely lived, and jobs never changed,
eventually, through search,2 everyone would find the job which most suited
him. "Imperfect information" would only characterize the niarket in the short
run. In the discussion below, we maintain a "continual flow of ignorance"
through a continual flow of new entrants into the labor force and a flow of
deaths out of it.3 This "flow of ignorance" is just large enough to offset—3--
the "flow of knowledge" resulting from searchbehavior, andanequilibrium
with imperfect information is sustained.
The second problem is, how do we induce differentfirms to pay different
wages?That is, imperfect informationmay explain why individuals pay a
price for a commodity which is in excess of the lowestprice being charged
in the market, or why they accept awage which is below the maximum being
paid in the market. But we still must explainwhy some profit maximizing
firms charge one price orpay one wage while other firms charge another
price or pay another wage.
We argue that by paying a higherwage, the firm lovers labor turnover
and hence its expected returns onspecific training. A low wage firm has
higher training costs. Under certain circumstances, theincrease in training
costs is just sufficient to offset the lowwages. Profits viewed as a function
of the wage paid must have more than one relativemaxima, with the value of
profits at the different relative maxima identical. Thesomewhat surprising
result of this paper is that this can be thecase under verysimpleconditions,
even when all firms have the same training costs.
There is an important interaction between the search forhigher wage
jobs and the search for jobs which "match" one's preferences.The existence
of wage dispersion clearly affects theprofitability of searching for a
"better match." What is not so obvious,however, is that when there is in—
perfect information of the second type ("matching individualstojobs") there
cannot, in general, exist a single wage, zero profit equilibrium.
Previous studies have focused on firm behavior whenfacing individuals
whose turnover rates are affected by thewage rate (Mortenson (1970), Salop—4—
(1973b),and with individual behavior in markets with wage dispersions
(Salop (1973a). But there have been no attempts to link the two sides of
the market together: the quit rate of the individuals is affected by the
wage distribution; the wage paid by the firm with a given training cost is
determined by the quit rate function, so the wage distribution in turn is
determinedby the distribution of training costs. Thus, corresponding to
anydistributionof training costs there is an equilibrium distribution of
wages. But the wage rates and quit rates associated with any given level of
training costs must be such that these firms just break even (assuming free
entry).
Our analysis can thus be viewed as an attempt at a simple general
equilibrium formulation of the conventional search models. Such a formula-
tion is required because in its absence we are likely to be misled into
formulating models in which there is not in fact wage or price dispersion,
because such an analysis is required if we are to make any validwelfare
economicstatements about the behavior of markets with imperfect information,
and becauseit canprovidethe basis of a macro—economic model with unemploy-
ment, explaining whywages do not fall even in the presence ofunemployment.
The exact characteristicsof the equilibrium turn out to depend rather
sensitivelyonthe exact assumptions one makes about production, search,
tastes,labor supply, andinformation.The simplest version of the model is
presentedin the next section; this is then extended to a number of different
directions in subsequent sections.3a—5—
2. The Basic Model
2.1 Introduction
The basic model presented in this section is a simplified versionof
the conventional search model. The basic ingredients (describedmore fully
below and modified in a number ofways in subsequent sections) are the
following:
(a) Individuals are continually searching for a better,i.e., in
our simplified model, higher paid, job. They quit when theysuccessfully
find a better job. (In the basic model, the intensity of searchwill be an
exogenous parameter.)
(b) For simplicity, we assume only one coiruriodity which we choose
asour numeraire. All production processes are characterizedby constant
returnst scale, and there is freeentry. Firms face specific training
costs. By paying higher wages, they reduce their turnover rate. Theoptimal
levelof wages depends on their training costs.
The assumptions of free entry and the constant returns to scaleproperty
of the technology make the zero profit condition seem natural. This in turn
has the implication that the scale of each firm isindeterminate;what is
determinate, however, is the wage distribution. Later, we shall show some
instances in which the zero profit condition may not be satisfied.
Implicitly,themodel with which we are dealing here is a dynamic one.
Firmshire workers and paythe training costs one period, receiving the returns
insubsequent periods. In making their decisions, they must form expectations
of future interest rates, prices, and other market conditions. We shall avoid
these problems by focusing on the long—run equilibrium, where thewage distribu-
tion, prices, etc., are invariant.—6—
Each firminequilibrium is then characterized by a wage and a level of
employment aridoutput;the market equilibrium is characterized by a wage
distribution. In equilibrium,5
(a) given the quit rate function generated by the wage distribu-
tion, each firmhaschosen the wage which maximizes its profits on each job
(position)
(b) all job positions make zero profits; and
(c) the markets for goods andlaborclear.
In the remainder of this section, we set up andanalyzethe equilibrium
of our simplified economy. We proceed in several stages: in Section 2.2 we
describe the behavior of individuals in the economy, while in Section 2.3 we
describe the behavior of firms as they face a given quit rate function.
Section 2.4 derives the quit rate function. Sections 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, and2.8
construct equilibria with a single wage, with two wages, with multiple wages,
andfinally,with a continuum of wages. Sections 2.9, 2.10, and2.11discuss
the welfare, comparative static, and stability properties of the equilibria.
2.2 Individual Behavior
We assume all individuals are identical.6 They die exponentially at
the rate i, andthey are replaced by an equal number of new workers, so
that the labor supply remains constant at L .Eachlaborer supplies one
unitof labor. When individuals enter the labor force, they randomly apply
fora job, which they accept. Meanwhile, they continue tosearch for a
better, i.e., a higher paying job. The length of time to go from onefirm
to another to find out its wage is a random variable described by a Poisson
process; the average number of searches per unit of time is s ,whichis—7--
fixed.There is no cost to search or to changingjobs, up to the search
intensity s ; more intensive search is prohibitivelyexpensive. Individuals
do not know the wage paid byany particular firm; since sis determined in
effect exogenously, we need make noassumption concerning whether the mdi—
vidual knows the wage distribution. Later (Section4), however, we shall
have to be more explicit on this point.
2.3 The Behavior of the Firm: The
Given the Quit RateFunction
Forsimplicity, we assume production processes require only labor,no
capital,7 and have constantreturns to scale. Thus, a productionprocess is
characterized by a fixed training costper worker T ,whichis assumed to
occur instantaneously upon hiring the worker, and bya level of output per
man-year a(T) .Inthe model of this section we assume that the firmhas no
choice of technique.7a
Thus, the only decision of the firmisto choose a wage. Clearly, ifat
that wage rate it is making a profit, it willattempt to expand; if it makes
a loss, it will contract or change itswage. We shall be concerned with
characterizing equilibria; accordingly, under the assumption offreeentry,
eachfirm makes zero profits, and sois indifferent about the scale ofpro-
duction. Thus, having determined awage policy, the firmsimplyaccepts for
employment all individuals who apply.
The wage is chosen so that it maximizes thepresent discounted value of
its profits on each worker hired. Our restrictionto stochastic equilibrium
analysis allows us to greatly simplify the problem, for then thewage is
constant over time, and is chosen to maximize:—8—
(2.1) p. a(T.) —[w.+ (q(w.) + r)T.]
where
r is the rate of discount (rate of interest
is the present discounted value of profits
q(w) is the quit rate function
The labor costs consist of the direct wage payments (w), training costs
to replaceworkers who quit (q),and interest on previous expenditures for
training costs (r). q ,thequit rate, acts essentially like a depreciation
factor on "human capital" expenditures of the firm. By increasing w,the
direct labor costs are increased but the turnover costs (the "depreciation
rate") is reduced. The profits are maximized (labor costs per worker mini—
ized) when
(2.2) 1 +q'(w)T=o.8
Normally, the quit rate function is drawn as in Figure la, as a convex
function. The iso—cost curve is a straight line with slope —lIT,andits
tangencywith the quit rate function gives the optimal wage. As we increase
training costs, we increase w smoothly.
No argument, however, has been given why the quit rate function should
have the given shape, rather than that of Figure lb. There, w <wfor
T<T.AsT increases above T,thereis a jump in the wage, and there-
afterit increases smoothly with T
















2.4The Determination of the Quit Rate Function
Thecrucial question, then, is the determination of the quit rate func—
tion. Under our assumptions, the quit rate is just the death rate, plus the
probability ofan individualfinding a better job. Thelatter is equal to
theaverage number of searches per unit oftime, times the probability that
onone of thesesearches the individualfinds a wage greaterthan the wage he
is presently receiving. For simplicity, weassumethe probabilityof finding
ajob with a wage higher than w is equal to the percentage of jobs paying
wages higher than w.IfF(w) is the percentage of firms whopay a wage
lessthan or equal to w ,thenthe quit rate is10'
11
(2.3) q(w) = + s(l —F(w))
Hence, ifF(w)is differentiable at w
(2.4) q'(w) =—sf(w)
where f(w) is the density function of w .Thus,for the quit rate func-
tion to be convex, the density function must be monotonically declining; i.e.,
the only continuous wage density functions are those in which the density
function of wage is monotonically decreasing. Li particular, continuous uni—
modal distributions, such asthe normaldistribution, imply that f' >0for
wages below the mode, and hence are not consistent withequilibrium.12
If all other firms were to pay a wage w ,thenthe quit rate function
would lookas in Figure 2a; ifa fraction r of the firmswere to pay a
wage w1 and the remainder were to pay a wage of w ,thequit rate function












w w 0 1 wage(2,5a) T
would be indifferent to paying a wage of wandawage of w1firms with
higher training costs pay w1 ,lowertraining costs w .Similarly,if a
fraction'if2 of the firms were to pay a wage w2 ,afraction were to
pay a wage w1 ,thenthe quit rate function would look as in Figure 2c.
Again, firms with training costs
(2.5b) T = = T
wouldbeindifferentto paying wage w2or wage w1 ; firms with training
costs
(2.5c) T =1 =
sfl' 1
would be indifferent to paying wage w andw1 Firms with training costs
greater than max (T2, w2 —w/s(7T1 + iT2)) paywage w2those with training
costsless than mm (T2, w2 —w/s(rr1 + iT2)) paywage w
Notethat if w1 is to be chosen by any firm, < i.e.,
Tr1
'if
(2.5d) > w -w w -w
1 o 2 1
This is the discrete version of the result notedabove thatcontinuous wage
densityfunctions must be a monotonically declining function of w
2.5 TheSingle Wage Equilibrium
There is a unique single wage equilibrium, characterized by the zero
profitconditioni+s








(2.6) a(T) =w+ (ij+r)T







The search intensity is sufficiently high that a firm finds it unprofitable
to pay the minimum wage. For the remainder of this section, we assume (2.7)
is satisfied, leaving until the next section a discussion of what happens if
it is not.
2.6 A Two—Wage Equilibrium






The wage paid by the high wage firms is always the same as that paid in the
single wage equilibria. But the low wage firm pays a lower wage; however,
because of the higher turnover rate, its labor costs are the same. Any pair
of (1T,w) satisfying (2.8) is an equilibrium. The quit rate function for
one such equilibrium is depicted in Figure 3a.
2.7 A Three—Wage Equilibrium









Quit rate function for continuous wage



















<1,qp1 + <1,satisfying(2.9) and
theinequality (2.5d) is an equilibrium.
2.8I'Iany Wage Equilibria
Itis clear that equilibria with any finite number of wage levels can
be constructed. Indeed, there may be a continuum of wage levels with a uni-
form density between w and w of l/sT,anda mass point at w0, with
> *—sT.(Figure 3b).
0-13-
3. Implications of the Basic Model
Our model has a number of important implications, which we take up in
this section. First, we show that most of the equilibria considered are not
Pareto efficient. Next, we show that a slight extension of our modelgen-
erates equilibria with unemployment and with positive profits. Finally, we
consider the implications of our results for the analysis of comparative
statics for search equilibria.
3.1 Welfare Economics
Bythe very nature of search and information there are important exter-
nalities which firms will not take into account.
First, as haslong been recognized (see, e.g., Arrow (1959)),imperfect
information means that all firms have, as it were, some degree of imonopoly
power; they can obtain workers even though they pay less than the "market
wage." They quickly lose workers to other firms, but in the meanwhile, they
are able to exploit the absence of information, provided the costs of turnover
are not too high. But what has not been sufficiently recognized is that this
exercise of monopoly power is, in some sense, itself the cause of imperfect
information; that is, it is the exercise of this monopoly power which results
in the wage differentials, in the absence of which search would beunnecessary.
There is thus a cost, in addition to the direct loss of consumer surplus
usuallyassociated with the exercise of monopoly power, in the additional
searchand turnover costs.
There is the further externality imposed on the low wage firm by an in-
crease in the wage of a high wage firm: although it reduces its own quit
rate——which at equilibrium results in a reduction in turnover costs just14-
sufficientto compensate for the increased wage——it increases the quitrate
ofother firms andthefirm fails to take account of the additional turnover
costs of the other firms.
Note that all of the equilibria with wage distributions are Pareto
inferior to that with a single wage. The low wage individuals are unambig-
uously worse off and resources are wasted in training that otherwise would
not need to have been spent.
The low wage firms may claim that they have to pay low wages because
of their high turnover; but it is equally true thattheyhavea highturnover
becausethey pay low wages.
3.2Unemployment Equilibria
The rigidity of real wages has long been recognized to play a central
role in generating unemployment equilibria. While older discussions ascribed
this rigidity to institutional factors, it has more recently been recognized
that if the wage affects the net productivity of the worker,'4 then the firm
maynotlower its wage, even in the face of excess supply.
The usual story for why there cannot exist unemployment equilibria is
that if workers are unemployed, they offer to work for less; if the wage is
bid down, demand for labor is increased andthe supply is decreased. The
processstops only when demand equals supply. In efficiency wage models,
this argument is not valid: firms may not hire workers at lowerwages if
to do so lowers their profits.
Here, lowering the wage increases the turnover rate, and hence firms
may be reluctant to lower the wage, even though there are workers available
willing to work for less.15— ) —
Toshow the nature of the unemployment equilibrium we replace our
assumption of a constant returns to scale technology with one with diminish-
ing returns; there is an aggregate production function F(L),andthe full
employment wage is defined by
(3,1) F'(L) + (+r)T
where L is the total available labor supply. The value of the marginal
productof labor at full employment equals the full employment real wage




Thenthey will wish to hire workers only to the point where
(3.3) F'(L*) =w+ (i+r)T
(3.4) L*<L
thatis, there will be unemployment. Moreover, provided condition (2.7) is
satisfied, there is no wage which is acceptable toworkers which yields a
higherprofit than w* .Hencefirms have no incentives either to change
the wage they pay or the number of workers they hire.
Note that if all firms could simultaneously change their wages, lowering
themto ,thenfull employment couldbe attained. Thus, unemployment is
causedby too high wages, but the excessively high wages come about not because
of union pressure; rather, the interactions of thewage policies of the dif-
ferent firms,and the inability of the different firms to coordinate their
wagepolicies, leads to an inefficient Nash equilibrium.—16—
Indeed,it is easy to see in this model how a disturbance to the economy
can move it from a position of full employment to one of unemployment.
Assume, initially, that the economy were at full employment but then the tech-
nology is disturbed in such a way as to decrease the marginal product of
labor. So long as all other firms continue to pay w,itpays each firm
to continue to do so: all adjustments take place in the number of workers
16
hired.
Though in the model formulated here, there exists a full employment
single wage equilibrium, in the model presented in Section 5 the only single
wage equilibrium mayentailunemployment.
3.3 Positive Profit Equilibrium
Though it seems natural enough to impose the zero profit condition in
a model with free entryand constantreturnstoscale, in models with costly
search, it is possible that there exist positive profit equilibria. The
usual story for why in equilibrium there must be zero profits is that if
profits are positive, some firm will attempt to recruit workers away from
the other firms,bidding up thewage; the process continues until there are
zero profits. But offering a slightly higher wage does not instantaneously
recruit all the workers, as it would if search costs were zero. By raising
its wage a little bit, the firmsucceedsin recruiting a few more workers——
those who arrive at its doors with current wages higher than the old wage
but below the new wage.
17The firm balances off the increased probability
of getting a worker with the decreased profits it gets per worker. Equilibrium
is characterized by the wages paid being profit maximizing wages, but not
necessarily zero profit wages. In equilibrium, all wages paid must make the-17--
same expected profits, and these must exceed the expected profits earned by
payingany otherwage. Thus, the wage distribution must satisfy
- [a-w-T(p+ r+s(1—F)) ]F
(3..) r +p + s(1—F)
=kfor wages paid
[a—w—T(ii+r+s(1—F))]
r+ + s(l_p)F <kfor wages not paid
since theprobability of having a worker who applies accept a job is F,and
the expected present discounted value of profits earned ifheaccepts is
(36) R
a —w—(p+s(1-F)+ r)T -r+p+s(1—F)




depicted in Figure 4. There is a mass point at
Even though atthehighest wage there are positiveprofits,increasing
the wage furtherrecruitsno additional workers, anddoesnot lower the quit
rate; hence firms have no incentive to raise wages. (Notice that all equilibria
must be of the form (3.7); there is still a multiplicity of equilibria, caused
by the indeterminancy of and k.) But in a positive profit equilibrium
there cannot be a mass point at the highest wage, since thenincreasing the
wage slightly further would have a discrete effect on the probability of
acceptance, andhenceon profits.'8F (w)
—17a—
Figure 4
wage wWith positive profits, there are incentives for firms to enter, but no
entering firms would have an incentive to offer a higher wage.
Though in the model presented so far, there is no determinatenumberof
firms (job—positions), a slight modification of the model allows forus to
determinethis. Assume that each job requires a machine that costs $K. The
profits described above (Eq. 3.6) are thus the expected present discounted
value of the quasi—rents. As entry occurs, the probability ofany worker
arriving at a firm declines, and hence following the departure of a worker,
theexpected time until the vacancy is filled increases; entry occurs until
the expected present discounted value of quasi—rents is equal to the price
of the machine. For simplicity, we assume a firm consists of one machine
(one j ob).Sincethe number of searches per worker per unit time is S
theaverage number of arrivals per unit time at afirm is sL/N ,whereL
is the number of workers and N the number of jobs. Hence a firm thatpays
sL a wage w has a probability of I= For havinga vacancy fi_led per
unitof time. Straightforward calculations establish that zero profits entails19
(3.8) K =___/- - q
y+r r+q / I+rr+q
whereq =s(1—F)+pand p =a—w—(q+r)T
EQ.(3.8) can be solved asbefore for the equilibrium wage distribution,
whichgives all firms the same profits; andthevalue of L/N which ensures
that the level of profits is zero.2°
Earlier, we noted that if condition (2.7) was not satisfied there would
beno zero profit equilibrium: it would always pay a firm to lower its wages
to the minimal acceptable wage, to exploit the monopoly power arising out of—19—
costly search. While when condition (2.7) is satisfied there exists positive
profit and zero profit equilibria, when condition (2.7) is not satisfied the
only equilibria have positive profits, and are of the form we have described
in this section.
An Alternative Resolution. If there is more than one commodity, then
there is an alternative way that, even when condition (2.7) is not satisfied,
a full employment zero profit equilibrium may be attained. Assume that there
is a second sector requiring no specific training; we let theoutput of that
sector be our numeraire. As firms enter the industry requiring training in
response to positive profits, price falls and profits are reduced,21
3.4Comparative Statics
Becauseof the continuum of equilibria, it is difficult to do meaningful
comparative static calculations. The question we are particularly interested
in is, does an increase in the search intensity lead to a narrowing of the
wage distribution? Although the partial equilibrium analyses have suggested
thatit would, the general equilibrium analysis of this paper suggests that
the contrary may occur. Consider the two-wage equilibria. An increase in s
either lowers the wage paid bythe low wage firm—-because of the higher tum—
over they cannot "afford" to pay as high wages as previously——orit reduces
theproportion of firms paying the high wage (i.e., the turnover rate oflow
:aefirms will be the same solongas sr is constant.)
3.5 lit
This paper is mainly concerned with equilibrium analysis; yet is isworth
noting in a heuristic manner an apparent instability of the multi—wage equilibria.Consider the two-wage equilibrium. If a single firm happened to switch from
paying wage wto paying wage w1 ,w1would become more profitable; all
the firms would switch. Conversely, if a single firm happened to switch from
paying w1 to paying w, w would become more profitable than w1 (since
now the turnover rate is lowered) and again it would pay all of the firms
paying w1 to switch. The only equilibrium which appears to be stable is
the single wage equilibrium. Again, not too much emphasis should be put on
this result, since, as we shall show in later sections, with slight elabora—
tions on the model, there may not even exist a single wage equilibrium.—2 1—
4.Robustnessof the Model
In developing the model of Section 2, we introduced a number ofsiinpli—
fying assumptions. We haveexploredthe consequences of loosening the various
assumptions, and on the basis of these explorations, we believe our model is
robust; if anything, it becomes easier to generate wage distributions and
equilibria with unemployment or positive profits, In this section, webriefly
describe two extensions of the model, to consider thepossibility that firms
have a choice of technique and that individuals have a choice of searchinten-
sity (with alternative specifications of the search technology). In the next
section,we consideranimportant extension to the case where firmsdifferin
their non—pecuniary characteristics.
4. 1Choice of Techn
Allowingfirms to have a choice of technique does not seriously alter
the analysis. It does, however, permitusto generate a richer class of wage
distributions. We assume thatoutputper man is an increasing concave function
oftraining costs,
(4.1) a'(T) >0, a"(T)<0
Two—WageDistributions. With two wages, a zero profit equilibriun is










andthe inequalities ensuring that the firm which chooses technique T1







Figure 5 shows diagrammatically the solution. (4.3) can be solved for
the high training cost technology: it is the same in all equilibria. Then
(4.2) can be solved for the wage which will yield zeroprofits for that
technique.Consider a wage w .Drawthe line through w0tangentto
a(T) .Letthe proportion of high wage paying firms be such that .i +r + sir
equals the slope of that line. Then, from (4.3) Twill bethe technique
chosenby firms paying w ,andfrom(4.2) these firms will just be breaking
even.
Notice that in the example we have constructed differences in training
costs are endogenous to the model; they are not an exogenously determined
characteristic of firms.
Distributions with any finite number of wage levels may similarly be
constructed.
Continuous Wage Distributions. If there is to beacontinuous distribu-








a (T)(4.5) a(T) =w+ T('j+r+s(1—F(w)))





(4.8) a' (—i—)=+ r + s(1-F)
Thus, the density function of wages can besimply related to the production
function a(T)
4.2 Search Costs andtheDetermination of Search Intensity
If there are costs associated with undertaking search, then a rational
individual, in deciding how much search he should undertake, would compare
the expected benefits at each search intensity with the costs.Itis natural
to assume that the costs are an increasing, convex function of search inten-
sity,i.e., if C(s) is the cost per unitoftime of search at intensity s
(4.9) C' >0
In effect, in our earlier analysis we assumed the cost function took on the
special shape depicted in Figure 6b.
The correct calculation of the benefits of search is not a siuLpie








Sof wages is, his attitudes towards risk, as well as his expectations con-
cerning the duration which he will keep anyjob.For instance, if the indi-
vidual does not know the wage distribution, not only does search yield a
direct return in the possibility of finding a better job, but it yields an
indirect return in enabling the individual to know better the wage distribu-
tionand henceto make a "better' decisionwith respect to search intensity.
For simplicity, assume the individual is risk neutral, andhasperfect infor—
inationabout the distribution of wages.22 Straightforward calculations verify
that the convexity of the quit rate function depends on the thirdderivative
ofthe search-cost function; clearly there is no necessity for the quit rate
function to be convex even when f is monotonically declining.
The extension of the analysis of Section 2 follows in a straightforward
manner. There is one situation in which a problem does arise: if the search
cost appears as in Figure 6c, then for the highest paying firm s. =0,and
thequit rate function is flat at w =w .Hence,no firm with positive
max
training costs would pay Wmax Accordingly, if there exists an equilibrium
wage distribution, it is the degenerate distribution whereall firms pay the
same wage equal to the minimum wage; but this in turn cannot be a zero profit
equilibrium. There exists a non—zero profit equilibrium with all firms paying
23 w= w
Although the cost function depicted in Figure 6c may be considered to be
pathological, and the problems generated are really those associated with the
fixedcost of search, even in that case there may exist a multiple wage
equilibrium if the non-pecuniary benefits resulting from search are taken
into account, or if individuals differ with respect to their search costs,—25—
with some individuals having C'(O)=0,oralternative information tech-
nologies (e.g. ,anindividual buys a newspaper, which reports to himsimul-
taneously allwage offers; see Salop and Stiglitz (1977)).
An Alternative Formulation. An alternative formulation ofour model
has been suggested by Dybvig and Jaynes. Everyoneapplies to every job, but
obviously accepts only those jobs which offer a higherwage. The firm selects
randomly among the interested applicants. Thus, a firm paying awage of w
has (p+F(w))Linterestedapplicants, where L is the total labor force. In the
steadystate equilibrium the number of vacancies atwage w is iiLf(w)
Rence, the probability of an individual at a firmpayingwagequitting













Jobs differ not only in the wages they pay, but in certain non—pecuniary
characteristics. Some individuals will prefer the characteristics associated
withone firm, others those associated with another firm. We assume, for
simplicity, that the individual does not know these characteristics until
after completing training, thereupon he knows them fully.26 The value, in
"consumption equivalents," of the non—pecuniary characteristics we denote by
9 .Withoutloss of generality, we let EB =o•27 The distribution of
evaluations of the non—pecuniary characteristics of any firm we denote by
N(O); that is, in a random sample of individuals arriving at the given firm,
M(e) willdiscover that their evaluation of its non—pecuniarycharacteristics
islessthan or equal to 0 .Weassume, moreover, that the evaluation of
firm i isindependent of his evaluation of firmj;andforsimplicity,
this distribution is the same for all firms. The density function we denote
by m(S).Arisk neutral individual at a job with wage w and whose non—
pecuniarycharacteristics hevalues at 0 accepts a job if its wage,
satisfies
(5.1) >w+0 .
Thusthe quit rate function is simply28
(5.2) q(w) =p+ fs(1—F(w+0))i(0,w)d0
where i(0,w) is the distribution of individuals by 0 in a firm paying
wage w (and can be related to N(O) and F(w)), so—27--
(5.3) q' =— 1sf(w+O)ii(O,w) dO + fs(1—F)(O,w)dO
The important implication of (5.3) is that even the firm which pays the
highestwage can, by further increments in its wage, reduce its turnover
rate, and, if it attempted to reduce its wage, it would increase its turn-
over rate, even though there are costs of search. There areseveral inter-
estingproperties of the equilibrium.
5.1Impossibility of a FullEmployment Single Wage Equilibrium
Ifall firms paid the same wage w* ,thenall individuals who discovered
that 0 <0would search for a better job and indeed, since they do not know
the characteristics of the job before accepting it and going through training,
would accept the first offer (since all firms pay the same wage).
The quit rate of a firm(insteady state) which decides to pay, say, a
wage w >wcan be easily calculated: all those with 0 <w*—wwill quit.
Those who do not quit make up a proportionately larger fraction of each
firm's labor force. Those with 0 <w-whave an average duration on the
job of 1/li + s while those with 0 >w-whave, an average duration of
1/li .Thusthe average quit rate is just







3w p(p + s)—28--
For there to be asingle wage equilibrium (assuming M(0) =1/2)
(57) 4sm(0)pi + s)=1
2 T (2p + s) w=w
whichwill not in general be the case.29
5.2 An Unemployment Equilibrium
If
5 8 _q(w,w*) =4sm(0)i(i+ s) 1 (•) —i — >
LJW L
(,41+ 5) w=w
there exists an unemployment equilibrium. The greaterthe unemployment rate,
thesmalleris the marginal effect of a decrease in the wage in increasing
theturnover rate.
LetUbe the unemployment rate; it is easy to see that,ingeneral,
thequitrate at any firm will depend on the unemployment rate aswellas the
wage w* being paid by all other firms:3°
q q(w,w*,u)
Then, the equilibrium unemployment rate is given by the solution of the pair
ofequations
(5.9) —T q(w*,w*,U) =1
(5.10) a=w*+ (q(w,w,U) + r)T
5.3 Non-Optimality of the Natural Rate of Unemployment
The unemployment rate derived intheprevious section canbethought of
as the natural rate of unemployment. This unemployment rate has, however, noobvious optimality properties. Assume the government worked to maximize
the expected utility of the representative worker; we assuzae, for simplicity,
thatthe government can control wages and the number of jobs (hence U)
directly, but that it is constrained to paying wages which break even, i.e.,
(5.10) must be satisfied. The only individuals who are uneiiiployed are the
young(all other individualsremain at their jobs until they find alternative
employment);3'once they obtain a job they receive a wage of w until they
die. The average present discounted value of their non—pecuniary enjoyment
depends on how frequently individuals quit;we write 0 =&(q),0'>0
Thus, the expected present discounted value of utility of an individual is
represented by
(5.11) g(U) + 0(q)]
where the function g(U) reflects the lowered discounted value of the life-
time stream of utility resulting from the fact that the individual does not
obtain employment immediately. The government wishes to maximize (5.11)
subjectto the constraint (5.10), which implies that
(512) = —T =
dU ' dU
wherewe havemade use of the fact that in the single wage equilibrium the
quit rate depends just on U ,noton w* •32
The government chooses U so that
(5.13) g'(iY) -+(q)] + g(1J)q[.j.+') 0
withthe inequality implying U=0—30—
Sinceg' (U) <0(increasing the unemployment rate increases the expected
time to obtain a job and hence decreases the present discounted value of
lifetime income), and <0,itis apparent that if
U= 0





Iftraining costs are high, the optimal unemployment rate may be positive.
There are several implicit differences between the market and the govern-
ment solutions. First, each firm believes that it can reduce its turnover by
raising its wage relative to others; but of course, when they all try to do
this, this simply raises the wage, reduces the demand for labor, but has no
direct effect on the turnover rate. The reduction in the demand for labor,
thatis, the increase in unemployment, has, however, an important externality
effect: itreducesturnover at all firms and this lowers aggregate expendi-
ture on training costs, enabling a consequent rise inthewage rate. Though
the firm fails to take into account this benefit of the increased unemploy-
mentrate, it alsofails to take into account the increased cost: the poorer
matching of individuals withfirms and the delay in youngindividuals obtaining
employment.We suspect, but have not been able to show, under any general set
ofconditions, that there is apresumptionthat the natural unemployment rate
is too high.—31—
In this section, we have simply compared the optimal single wage
equilibrium with the single wage market equilibrium. The government can
choosea whole wage distribution; optimality may well entail wage inequality:
workers who are ex ante identical receive different wages.33
5.4FrictionalUnemployrnent
There is a second, quite distinct kind of unemploymentwhichcanarise
in a slight variationof the model presented so far. If we assumethat
searchcan onlybe undertaken while the individual is unemployed, or more
generally,that search may be carried on less expensively while unemployed,
then the equilibrium may be characterized by a certain level of frictional
unemployment. All those who find that their evaluation of the non—pecuniary
attributes of the firm are sufficiently negative quit, arid (in the absence
of the kind of unemployment described in 5.3 or 3.2) remain unemployed for
an expected duration of 1/s. the time to arrive at the next firm.
5.5 Positive Profits Equilibrium
If
(5.14) q(w,w*)<4 forall w >w
1w =
thereexistsapositive profits equilibrium. (5.14) implies that firms will
wish to lowertheir wages until the minimum acceptable wage w.Ingeneral,
atw
a >w+ (q+r)T—32—
there are positive profits. The analysis of the positive profitsequilibrium
follows along the lines of Section 3.
5.6 Multiple Wage Equilibrium
Thus far, in this section we have shown that withnon—pecuniary charac—
teristics of jobs there does not exist a singlewage zero profit full employ-
ment equilibrium, but there may exist a singlewage equilibrium, either with
positive profits or unemployment. A natural question to raise at this juncture
is, can we have a multiple wage zero profit full employment equilibrium; in
other words, do our difficulties arise from the restriction to all firms
payingthe same wage? The answer is no: there do not exist multiplewage
full employment zero profit equilibria either.
As before, let r be the proportion of firms payingw1 >w .The
quit rate function can now be written as
—w)M(w1 —w)—M(w—w) 1 —
M(w1
—w) 0 + ° + q p+s p+sTr
so
q(w*,w ,w1,lr) 2 1 1 1 1 ___________= -q{m(w -w)( -+)-i- m(wl- -






w2+ T[q(w2;w1,w2,iT) + r]
Theseprovide four equations in three unknowns and a careful examination of
the structure of the equations in the context of simple examplesshould
readilyconvince the reader that there is no redundancy. Moreover, increasing
thenumber of wage levels does not resolve the difficulty; for each wage level
we add two unknowns,the wage rate, and theproportion of firms at that wage
rate;arid two equations,the zero profit equation andtheprofit maximization
equation.—34—
6.Concluding Comments
In this paper we have investigated the implications of imperfect inf or—
mation for the equilibrium wage distribution. We have shown how, even in a
steady state equilibrium, identical labor may receive different wages; the
competitive forces which we normally think of as eliminating such differences
34 inthe long run may not do so when there is imperfect information, Indeed,
this may be the case even when the only source of "imperfect information't is
theinequality of wages which the market it perpetuating. Whenthere are
informationimperfections arisingfrom (symmetric) differences in non—
pecuniary characteristics of jobs and preferences of individuals, there will
not in general exist a full employment, zero profit single wage equilibrium.
Perhaps even more significant was the result that in equilibrium, there
could be unemployment; in spite of the presence of an excess supply of labor,
no firm is willing to hire workers at a lower wage, since it knows that if ic
does so, the quit rate will be higher, and hence turnover costs (training
costs) will be higher, so muchso that profits will actually be lower. Thus,
thismodel provides a rationale for real wage rigidity. The model, in addi-
tion, provides a theory of frictional unemployment, as workers who are badly
mismatched with firms (in terms of the non—pecuniary characteristics of the
job)rejoin the unemployment pool to seek a better match.
Thoughthe constrained optitnality (that is, taking explicitly into
account the costs associated with obtaining information and search) may entail
unemployment and wage dispersion, the levels of unemployment and wage disper-
sion in the market equilibrium will not, in general, be optimal. The nature
of the government intervention that is necessary to effect a Pareto improve-
ment is, unfortunately, far from obvious.—35—
FOOTNOTES
1.In addition, they may or may not know the wage distribution. In later
sections, we shall need to be more explicit about what information in-
dividuals have prior to making their search decisions.
2.If search is costly, individuals will stop short of obtaining "perfect
information," and so price (wage) dispersions might be maintained.
3. If there were exogenous sources of uncertainty, e.g., technical change,
so that "jobs" have a finite life, then the analysis would be similar
to that contained here.
3a. Since this paper was originally written, a number of other theories of
price or wage distribution havebeenformulated. Without presenting
a complete survey of what has become an extensive literature, It may be
useful to note a few of the more important strands. In Salop (1977)
and Salop and Stiglitz (1977), the price distribution is used to dis-
criminate among individuals who have different search costs. In earlier
versionsof this paper, as well as inReinganum (1979),firms with dif-
ferent technologies can be shown to pay different wagesor charge dif—
ferentprices. In Mortenson (j973Y,costlysearch prevents labor mar-
kets from becoming fully arbitraged in response to disturbances in sub—
markets. (The arguments are analogous to those of Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) who show that with costly Information, capital markets cannot
become fully arbitraged.) Closest in spirit to this paper are those
studies which have attempted to show that equi1i'brii may be characterized
by a price distribution, even if individuals and firms are identical and
even if there are no exogenous sources of noise (Salop and Stiglitz (1982),
Butters (1977)). While in Butters, stores which charge lower prices are
able to recruit more customers per dollar spent on advertising, in our
model, firms which pay higher wages are able to retain workers for a
longer duration.
4. Because our model is stochastic, to avoid random variationsinthe aggre-
gate variables of interest, we assume a large economy.
5.In more general versions of this model, to characterizethe equilibrium
wealso needto specify the choice oftechnique by thefirm, the choice
of search intensities by individuals, and the relative prices of differ-
entcommodities. There are, correspondingly, some additional equilibrium
conditions;e.g., each firmchooses its technique to maximize its profits;
eachindividual chooseshis search intensity (giventhe wage of the firm
heis presently at, the costs of search, and the wage distribution) to
maximize his expected utility.
6. InSection5, we assume individuals differ with respect to their eval-
uation of the non-pecuniary characteristics associated with any firm.
The assumption of identical individuals is made to avoid the possibility
that the equilibrium wage disTtribution is generated by firms' attempting
to act as discriminating monopolists.SeeSalop andStiglitz (1977).—36—
7.Alternatively, if firms are large, then the number of applicants will
equal the number of deaths; then the firm's production process may in-
volve capital as well as labor. In other cases; that is, for small
firms with capital, after each death or quit there may be a (random)
period of idleness of the machine or the firm may carry an inventory of
underemployed workers. This means that firms must worry about the per-
centage of time machines which are idle, and individuals may apply to
firms with no vacancies. This complicates but does not basically change
the analysis.
7a, We assumehere (as in fact seems to bethe case) that at least some
partof the specific training and turnover costs are borne by the firm.
For a model in which the contract design is endogenous (so that inpar-
ticular, the fraction of the specific training and turnover costs borne
bythe firm is endogenously determined) see Arnott and Stiglitz (J983.
Theyshow that so long as workers are more risk asverse than firms,a
fraction of the specific training costs will be borne by firms. (For
afurther discussion of the point, see also Stiglitz (1974).
8. The number of applicants who are willing to accept a job is, ofcourse, afunction of the wage offered, but because of the zeroprofLtcondition,
this has no effect on the wage offered in equilibrium. But see below.
9. This is consistent, for instance, with each of the large firms having a
number of places to apply, in proportion to the number of jbs which are
available.
10.If instead of assuming that the time required to sample an additional
firm is a random variable we had assumed the individual makes s
searches per unit time, then
q(w)=+ (1 —(F(w))S),q'=_sFSlfl
Therest of the calculations must similarly be modified ina straight-
forwardmanner.
11. It isclear from (2.3) that thequit rate is a function not only of the
wage paid by the firm in question, but by all other firms. Thus if there




Ournotation suppresses thedependence of q.on w. ,jI,and
isdenoted by q'(w) .- 37
12.Not too much emphasis should be placed on this result, since, as we
shall see, it is not true in more complicated versions of the model.
13.Several different interpretations can be given to w. .Inaneconomy
with effective minimum wage legislation, then w1 is the legislated
minumum wage. Alternatively, w. may be thought of as the reservation
wage, below which individuals will not work. Or w.11 maybe thought
of asthe wage which individuals could earn in self—employment. Or there
maybe one sector in which there is an organized, competitive labor market
of the conventional sort; individuals know they can obtain employnient in
that sector. Finally, the efficiency wage may provide the minimum wage.
(See fn.
14. These theories are broadly referred to as efficIencywagetheories; in
the development literature, they were first discussed by Leibenstein
(1956). While in his theory productivity depended on wages because of
nutrition, subsequent developments by Stiglitz (1976, 1982a, 1982b.),
Weiss (1980), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1982), and Calvo (1979) related pro-
ductivity to wages through selection (the quality of the applicant pooi
is affected by the wage paid) and incentive effects. For a more extensive
development of the relationship between turnover andunemploymentin a
slightly different model, see Stiglitz (1974).
15. We assume throughout this paper—-we would argue realistically——that there
are some turnover costs borne by the firm. A natural question to raise
at this juncture is, if the worker cannot induce the firm to hire him by
lowering his wage, why can't he simply offer to pay a larger fraction
(possibly all) of the turnover costs. There are at least three possible
explanations. First, workers may not have the capital to pay forthe
training costs. Second, there is amoralhazard problem on the part of
thefirm; it could take the application fee, which is allegedly for
training, and shortly thereafter fire him. Third, those workers who
are willing to pay the most for the job may not be the most productive
(thereare quality—selection effects). The arguments are parallel to
thosepresented in Stiglitz andWeissfor why an increase incollateral
requirementsmay not be used to equilibrate the credit market, or in
Shapiro—Stiglitzfor why bonding may not eliminate the incentive—
unemployment with which they were concerned.
In anycase,all that matters for our analysis isthat,forone
reasonor another, there are some turnover costs borneby the firm.—38--
16. Similar arguments hold for any other change in technology, e.g., a
change in s ,T,r,ori .Notethat an increase in the real
interest rate will, in this model, lead to unemployment.
17. We are explicitly ruling out other meansbywhich firms may recruit
workers, e.g., by advertising. These methods, too, are not costless
Ourassumptionsensure that thenumberof applicants atafirmarein-
dependentof the wage it pays. This would not be the case under alter-
native hypotheses concerning the information structure.
18. This result is dependent on our assumption that the number of searches .rn4,.. +4.., 4 +4..1 1.. T .-.1 1 W.fl.LL L'S LSLUC .2.0, CS.LCL.LSVCLJCa¼JGCLL...Ju.0SJ ..ACLCLULJ.LSCLLSSi. CJ...S tJ LtCS
firmspaythe same wage, then if there is any marginal cost to doing any
search,if any single firmraisesits wage, it will not induce any
search,andhencewill not increase the speed with which it fills vacan-
cies. It is easy to see, more generally, that there may exist equilibria
in which at the highest wage there is a mass point.
19. The expected present discounted value of a worker, once he is hired, is
p /r+q .Theexpected present discounted value of a vacancy at time t
is Vet ,andsuch a vacancy will occur at twithprobability qeqt
The total return to a machine can thus be written
—rt -
V=I Ve I +qV f Ie_rtdt
r+q o L
Probability The present discounted value
of filling of a vacancy filled at time t
a vacancy
attime t
20. Implicitly, throughout the analysis, we are assuming that the machines
cannot be rented out when they are idle.
21. For a more extensive elaboration of the two—sector model with equilib—
rium wage distributions, see the 1974 IMSSS version of "Equilibrium Wage
Distributions. U
Theanalysis requires that the training costs not entail simply
output of the training goods sector.—39---
22. The maximum expectedpresent discounted value of net income of thein-
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wherethe second order condition implies that C" >0.From(4.11) we
obtain the search intensity as a function of the wage paid (given the
distribution F(w)).
23.If the amount of labor each individual supplies is a function of w
(rather than fixed, as in the analysis of the rest of this paper), then
theequilibrium wage will be themonopoly wage, i.e., if L(w) is the
amountof labor an individual supplies as a function ofthe wage, the
equilibriumwage will be given by the solution to
+wf'(w*)0
This corresponds to the result of Diamond (1971), who shows that the
equilibrium in his search model involves a single price at the monopoly
level. But note how dependent itison the particular ass-rmptions made.
24. We have ignored the possibility that in any period the indiv±ual gets
offeredsimultaneously two jobs. If the periods are short, sothat the
numberof vacancies is small relative to the number of applicants, this
isa small probability event; in our continuous time formulation, this
is a zero probability event.




low wage individuals and those newly entering the labor force apply for
the piL vacancies at high wage firms, their chance of getting oneof
thehigher wagejobs is nr/(l—-ir) + p.
Anycombinationof (w,ir)satisfying w =w—niT/1—'rr+iwilldo. 0 0 1
pf . wipT Forthe continuum, —q T =1,or-jj T =1,i.e.,F =ke —1.1.
f or Wmin <i.iTln(l+p)/k, k <p.If>w.,there is a mass
point at w w; there is never a mass point at w
max.
26. There are, of course, some non—pecuniary characteristics which are known
beforeaccepting the job; there will affect the acceptance rate, but not
the quit rate. Similarly, there are pecuniary characteristics, such as
promotion policy, that may become knownonlygradually to the individual.—40—
27.If most individuals agree that one firmhasmore desirable character-
istics than another, we can simply add the mean value of U onto the
wage.
28. For simplicity, we revert to our search model of Section2 where $is
fixed. For the more general case, see the 1974 IMSSS version of
"EquilibriumWage Distributions."
29, While in the earlier case, a policy of a constantwage was optimal, it willnot necessarily be sohere, since those who remain longer with the firmhave revealed information about their evaluation of thenon—pecuniary
characteristics of the firm; namely, that 8 >0.Thefirm can exploit
that information in designing a senioritywage structure. This is a
difficult problem, the solution to which would not alter the basic qual-
itative propositions put forth in this section,
Similar considerations suggest that our first order condition (5.7)
is only approximately correct; if the firm chooses a fixedwage rate,
the probability that any individual quits will bea function ofthe
length of time he has been on the job, i.e., q =q(w,t).Thepresent






In our analysis we have replaced (w,t) with q(w,cc)-.Again,the
centralresult, that for all w >Wmjn
0 when w w* for all firms
isstill valid.
30. The derivation of the quit rate function from the underlying assumption
on search and non-pecuniary evaluations is tedious; all that is crucial
for our result is that q(w,w*,tJ) < 0at w =
31.This assumes that 8mjfl < w*,i.e.,,the non-pecuniary disutility does
notexceed the wage; the modification for the case where some individuals
quit to join the unemployment pool is straightforward..
32. This follows from our strong assumption that individuals value jobs by
w+ 8, sothere are no incomeeffectsin the valuation of non—pecuniary
attributes.—1—
33.For an example with this property, see the IMSSS version of "Equilibrium
Wage Distributions."REFERENCES
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